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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-2147 
___________ 
 
MARK C. MEADE, 
                        Appellant 
 
v. 
 
KIDDIE ACADEMY DOMESTIC FRANCHISING, LLC; CIT GROUP INC;  
WILLIAM ENDRES; GREGORY HELWIG; MICHAEL MILLER; STEVEN TROY;  
SUSAN WISE; MARK E. MORENO 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil No. 2-11-cv-04077) 
District Judge:  Honorable Dennis M. Cavanaugh 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
September 27, 2012 
 
Before:  AMBRO, JORDAN and VANASKIE, Circuit 
 
Judges 
(Opinion filed: October 15, 2012) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Mark C. Meade, proceeding pro se, appeals from an order of the United States 
District Court for the District of New Jersey dismissing his complaint.  Because this 
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appeal does not present a substantial question, we will summarily affirm the District 
Court’s order.  See
 In March 2006, Meade established the Dasoda Corporation (“Dasoda”) in order to 
open a franchise of Kiddie Academy Domestic Franchising LLC (“Kiddie Academy”), a 
franchisor of child care learning centers.  That November, Dasoda and Kiddie Academy 
entered into a franchise agreement for the operation of a center in Jackson, New Jersey.  
CIT Group loaned Dasoda funds to purchase and operate the franchise.  It appears that 
Dasoda’s business venture was unsuccessful.   
 3d Cir. LAR 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6. 
 Meade initially filed the underlying complaint in the Superior Court of New 
Jersey, Law Division, Morris County, against Kiddie Academy and several of its 
employees (the “Kiddie Academy Defendants”).1
                                              
1 This is Meade’s second complaint against these defendants.  On February 16, 
2011, he commenced an action in the District Court that contained many of the same 
allegations, but, by order entered October 25, 2011, the District Court dismissed the 
complaint on the grounds that Meade failed to satisfy the applicable pleading 
requirements, he lacked standing to file the suit, his claims were subject to arbitration 
provisions in the franchise agreement, and the District Court was the wrong forum for his 
action.  Meade v. Kiddie Academy Domestic Franchising, No. 11-cv-0900, 2011 WL 
5104501 (D.N.J. Oct. 25, 2011). 
  Meade claimed that the Kiddie 
Academy Defendants made various fraudulent statements and misrepresentations in order 
to induce him to sign the franchise agreement.  For example, Meade claimed that the 
Kiddie Academy Defendants had grossly overstated the financial performance data and 
misrepresented the costs of operating the business.  Meade also claimed that the Kiddie 
Academy Defendants had breached various terms of the agreement by, for example, 
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failing to assist him with finding a location for his franchise, and failing to assist with 
teacher instruction, classroom set up, training, and licensing requirements.  Meade’s 
complaint set forth a host of other alleged wrongdoings by the Kiddie Academy 
Defendants, including violations of state consumer rights laws, federal racketeering 
violations, bank fraud, and more.  Meade sought approximately eight million dollars in 
damages from the Kiddie Academy Defendants, as well as an injunction to stop the sale 
of all Kiddie Academy franchises in the state of New Jersey.  In addition to the Kiddie 
Academy Defendants, Meade also named as defendants CIT Group and one of its former 
employees (the “CIT Group Defendants”).  Meade sought more than two million dollars 
in damages from the CIT Group Defendants.  The Kiddie Academy Defendants removed 
the complaint to the District Court on July 15, 2011.   
     The Kiddie Academy Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds 
that, inter alia
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and exercise 
plenary review over the District Court’s dismissal order.  
, Meade did not have standing to seek damages for injuries sustained by 
Dasoda.  The CIT Group Defendants also filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Meade’s 
purported fraud allegations did not satisfy the pleading requirements of Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 9(b).  By order entered March 28, 2012, the District Court granted the 
defendants’ motions and dismissed the complaint.  This appeal followed.  
Marcavage v. Nat’l Park Serv., 
666 F.3d 856, 858 (3d Cir. 2012).  Dismissal is proper if a party fails to allege sufficient 
factual matter, which if accepted as true, could “state a claim to relief that is plausible on 
4 
 
its face.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).  We may summarily affirm if the appeal presents 
no substantial question.  See
 The District Court properly granted the Kiddie Academy Defendants’ motion to 
dismiss.  We need not address each basis for the District Court’s decision to dismiss the 
complaint, as it is clear to us that Meade lacked standing to pursue this suit.  It is well 
established that, absent a direct individual injury, the president and principal shareholder 
of a corporation lacks standing to sue for an injury to the corporation.  
 3d Cir. LAR 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.  
See, e.g., Jones v. 
Niagara Frontier Transp. Authority (NFTA)
 The District Court also properly granted the CIT Group Defendants’ motion to 
dismiss.  We have reviewed the complaint, and agree with the District Court that Meade 
failed to specifically identify any wrongful act or omission by either CIT Group or its 
employees.  Therefore, for substantially the same reasons provided by the District Court, 
Meade failed to comply with the pleading requirements of Rule 9(b).  
, 836 F.2d 731, 736 (2d Cir. 1987) 
(explaining that, even though the plaintiff shareholder may have faced the risk of 
financial loss as a result of injuries to the corporation, “[a] shareholder—even the sole 
shareholder—does not have standing to assert claims alleging wrongs to the 
corporation”).  Because Meade’s claims all involved injuries to Dasoda stemming from 
the franchise agreement between Dasoda and Kiddie Academy, and because Meade did 
not allege that the Kiddie Academy Defendants took any actions against him in his 
individual capacity, he did not have standing to sue for injuries sustained by Dasoda.   
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 
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9(b) (“In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances 
constituting fraud or mistake.”); see also In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig.
 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that no substantial question is presented by 
this appeal.  
, 618 F.3d 
300, 348 (3d Cir. 2010) (discussing the “heightened pleading requirements” of Rule 
9(b)).   
See 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.  We have considered Meade’s arguments in support 
of the appeal and conclude that they are without merit.  Accordingly, we will summarily 
affirm the District Court’s judgment.   
